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Abstract 
In human-human interactions co-representing a partner’s actions is crucial to 
successfully adjust and coordinate actions with others. Current research suggests that 
action co-representation is restricted to interactions between human agents facilitating 
social interaction with conspecifics. In the present study, we investigated whether 
action co-representation, as measured by the Social Simon Effect (SSE), is present 
when we share a task with a real humanoid robot. Further, we tested if the believed 
humanness of the robot’s functional principle modulates the extent to which robotic 
actions are co-represented. We described the robot to participants either as 
functioning in a biologically inspired human-like way or in a purely deterministic 
machine-like manner. The SSE was present in the human-like, but not in the machine-
like robot condition. The present findings suggest that humans co-represent the 
actions of non-biological robotic agents when they start to attribute human-like 
cognitive processes to the robot. Our findings provide novel evidence for top-down 
modulation effects on action co-representation in human-robot interaction situations. 
Words: 161 
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Introduction 
As humans we have much experience in sharing tasks with other humans. Due 
to the recent fast technical development, interactions with robotic agents will increase 
in daily life in areas such as health care, education or entertainment. However, little is 
known about the cognitive processes involved in real world joint action between 
humans and robotic interaction partners.  
In human-human interaction one crucial aspect for successful action 
coordination with a partner is the formation of mental representations of a partner’s 
actions (Sebanz, Bekkering, & Knoblich, 2006). The cognitive representation of 
other’s actions during dyadic interactions has recently been investigated with different 
joint action paradigms (Atmaca, Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2011; Atmaca, Sebanz, Prinz, 
& Knoblich, 2008; Lam & Chua, 2010) with the most prominent of them being the 
Social Simon Task. In the Social Simon Task a standard Simon Task is divided 
between two individuals sharing the task. In a standard Simon Task, one of two 
possible stimuli (e.g., square and diamond) is displayed either on the left or the right 
side of a monitor to a single participant. The participant performs spatially defined 
manual responses to non-spatial stimulus attributes (e.g., right button press for 
diamond, left for square). Responses are faster when stimulus and response are 
spatially compatible (facilitation) than when they are spatially incompatible 
(interference). The difference in reaction times between spatially compatible and 
incompatible conditions is called the Simon Effect (Simon & Rudell, 1967). The 
Simon Effect is absent when the participant has to respond to only one of the two 
stimuli disregarding the other (Individual Go/Nogo Task). When two participants 
share the Simon task, so that one participant responds to only one stimulus (e.g., 
square) and the other participant responds to the other stimulus (diamond), a Simon 
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Effect is reintroduced, which is called the Social Simon Effect or SSE (Hommel, 
Colzato, & van den Wildenberg, 2009; Liepelt, Wenke, Fischer, & Prinz, 2011; 
Sebanz, Knoblich, Prinz, & Wascher, 2006). Although each participant has the same 
task as in an individual go/nogo situation, partnering the two individuals in a shared 
task setting reinstates the Simon Effect in each of them. The SSE is regarded as a 
measure of action co-representation, i.e. both participants cognitively represent the 
action and/or task of the partner as if each one was in charge of the full, undivided 
task (Sebanz, Knoblich, & Prinz, 2003; Sebanz, Knoblich, & Prinz, 2005). Recently, 
Wenke and colleagues proposed, that the content of co-representation is the 
representation of whether and when the co-actor has to respond (Wenke et al., 2011). 
The co-actor’s response might represent a salient event, that provides an alternative 
for the actor’s own response. Like this, a reference frame for a spatial coding of 
responses might be induced (Dolk et al., 2011; Guagnano, Rusconi, & Umiltà, 2010), 
leading to response facilitation in compatible trials and response interference in 
incompatible trials.   
Most research on action co-representation suggests that the shared 
representational system is primarily tuned to other humans (Kilner, Pauligan, & 
Blakemore, 2003; Tsai, Kuo, Hung, & Tzeng, 2008). For example, Tsai and Brass 
(2007) replaced the human interaction partner in a Social Simon Task with a video of 
either a human hand or a wooden hand. They found a significant SSE in the human 
hand condition, but not in the wooden hand condition. However, this study and most 
other studies investigating biological tuning of the shared representational system 
used rather virtual and unreal interaction situations, in which participants observed or 
interacted with videos or simple pictures of artificial agents. Based on the assumption 
that interacting with an agent in real-time is fundamentally different compared to 
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passively observing action videos (Schilbach et al., 2006), we think that it may be 
premature to draw definite conclusions regarding the nature of shared representations 
for non-biological agents. More real world interaction situations need to be tested to 
fully understand the mechanisms underlying dyadic human-robot interactions. 
Moreover, recent studies suggest that the shared representational system is affected by 
the intentionality attributed to an agent (Atmaca et al., 2011; Liepelt, von Cramon, & 
Brass, 2008), independent of whether the agent is human or non-human in its nature 
(Liepelt & Brass, 2010; Müller et al., 2011a; Stanley, Gowen, & Miall, 2007).  
In the present study, we tested if humans do co-represent actions of a 
humanoid robot in a real world interaction situation. Further, we investigated if the 
magnitude of action co-representation can be modulated by the intentionality 
attributed to a robotic interaction partner. All participants performed a Social Simon 
Task together with a humanoid robot under perceptually identical conditions, but 
prior to the task, we manipulated the participant’s belief about the functional principle 
of the robot. The robot was either described as functioning in a biologically inspired, 
autonomous way (human-like robot condition) or in a purely deterministic way 
(machine-like robot condition).  
If action co-representation is sensitive to the intentionality attributed to an 
agent, we expected to find a larger SSE in the human-like robot condition compared 
to the machine-like robot condition. If, however, action co-representation is not 
sensitive to the intentionality attributed to a robot, we expected to find no difference 
in the SSE between the two conditions. If action co-representation is restricted to 
biological agents only, we expected to find no SSE in either condition. 
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Method 
Participants 
Forty-eight students from technical studies and humanities of the University 
Jaume I participated in the experiment. Twenty-four were randomly assigned to the 
human-like robot condition (12 men, Mage=19.13 years, SDage=4.24 years), and 
twenty-four were randomly assigned to the machine-like robot condition (12 men, 
Mage=20.38 years, SDage=4.31 years). Each participant received €10 for participation. 
Participants gave their informed consent to participate in the study, which was 
conducted in accordance with the ethical standards laid down in the 1975 Declaration 
of Helsinki.  
Apparatus 
The experimental program was controlled by a Laptop attached to a 16-inch 
CRT monitor. The viewing distance was 60 cm. Responses were recorded with two 
keyboards placed on a table next to each other (Figure 1). The right command key 
located in the center of each keyboard served as response key.  
The robot Tombatossals, a humanoid torso with a pan/tilt/vergence 
anthropomorphic head, eyes-cameras, arms, and a three-finger, four-degrees-of-
freedom Barrett Hand (left hand) (Chinellato, Antonelli, Grzyb, & del Pobil, 2011) 
served as the co-actor in a Social Simon Task (Figure 1). 
--- Figure 1 --- 
Stimuli and Procedure 
Each trial began with the presentation of a fixation point (white dot, 0.4° x 
0.4°) in the center of a black screen for 250 ms. Then, either a white square or a 
diamond (1.9° x 1.9°) appeared 8.0° left or right of the fixation point for 250 ms. 
Stimulus types and placements were randomly interleaved. Responses had to be given 
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within 1800 ms. Afterwards visual feedback about the accuracy of the response was 
provided for 300 ms: The fixation dot turned green in case of correct responses, and 
red in case of an error. After a constant inter-trial interval of 1850 ms the next trial 
started. The experiment consisted of 512 trials separated by short breaks after every 
128 trials.  
The participant (left side) responded as fast and as accurately as possible 
whenever the square was presented by pressing the left response key with the index 
finger of his/her right hand. The robot (right side) responded to the diamond by 
pressing the right response key with the rightmost finger of its left hand (“index” 
finger). The finger was held slightly above the keyboard, and moved down to press 
the key when a trigger signal was received. The two joints of the finger moved 
simultaneously while the rest of the hand as well as the robot’s body posture was kept 
completely still throughout the whole experiment (Figure 1, Supplement 1).  
We manipulated the participant’s belief about the robot’s functional principle 
between the human-like robot condition and the machine-like robot condition. In the 
human-like robot condition, the robot was described as an active and intelligent agent. 
Participants were informed that the robot was able to perceive stimuli with its own 
eyes (cameras), to actively explore its environment, and to autonomously respond on 
the basis of a biologically inspired neural network. In the machine-like robot 
condition, the robot was described as a passive and purely deterministic agent. 
Participants were informed that the robot was a mechatronic device that was 
completely controlled by the commands of a computer program, thus passively 
executing external motor commands. The information about the robot was given to 
participants as a written text. Text length was roughly matched between both 
conditions. After participants had read the instructions, a master student (and not the 
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experimenter) read the instructions out aloud in a standardized way with no special 
emphasis on either condition.  
In order to provide a human-like behaviour by the robot and allow a 
comparison with data from human-human interaction experiments the robot was 
controlled by an operator hidden from the view of the participant. The stimulus 
program generated a tone, in trials in which the robot was supposed to respond, which 
was presented to the operator via headphones. When hearing the tone, the operator 
pressed a keyboard button to trigger the finger movement of the robot, which was 
controlled by the robot’s software. Therefore, reaction times were roughly matched to 
those of a typical human interaction partner (mean reaction time: 371 ms). The 
stimulus program included a certain percentage of random errors (1.6% of trials) so 
that the robots rate of correct responses was also comparable to that of a human 
interaction partner. The robot behavior, the visual stimulation, and the task were 
identical in both (human-like and machine-like) conditions. Debriefing after the 
experiment showed that no participant was aware that an external operator controlled 
the robot’s behavior. 
 
Results 
Response time analysis 
The median response times (RTs) per participant for correct responses were 
calculated and entered into an analysis of variance (ANOVA) for repeated measures 
with compatibility (compatible vs. incompatible) as a within-subject factor and belief 
(human-like robot vs. machine-like robot) as a between-subject factor. The SSE was 
measured by subtracting RTs for compatible trials from RTs for incompatible trials. 
Subjects with a difference score of 2.5 SD below or above the group mean had to be 
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excluded from analysis (Müller et al., 2011b), which resulted in the exclusion of one 
subject. Prior to statistical RT analysis, all error trials (2.5%) were excluded. Because 
of the low number of error rates, which reflects the relative ease of a simple stimulus 
discrimination task, error rates were not analyzed further.  
We found a significant main effect of compatibility, F(1,45) = 9.39, p = .004, 
partial η2 = .17, indicating shorter RTs in compatible (337 ms) compared to 
incompatible trials (341 ms), confirming the presence of an overall SSE. A significant 
interaction between compatibility and belief, F(1,45) = 4.95, p = .03, partial η2 = .10, 
indicated that the SSE was significantly larger in the human-like robot condition (8 
ms), F(1,23) = 10.48, p = .004, partial η2 = .31, compared to the machine-like robot 
condition (1 ms), F(1,22) = .56, p = .46, partial η2 = .03 (Figure 2). There was no 
significant main effect of belief, F(1,45) = 1.07, p = .31, partial η2 = .02. 
--- Figure 2 --- 
Belief manipulation check 
To test whether the belief manipulation was successful, participants were 
asked to rate statements regarding the perceived intentionality of the robot’s actions at 
the end of the experiment. The items were “The robot acted intentionally” and “The 
robot decided actively when to respond to a stimulus”, which had to be rated on a 
five-point Likert Scale (0=‘strongly disagree’, 4=‘strongly agree’). We calculated the 
average score of both items, as they seemed to measure the same construct 
(Cronbach’s Alpha=.79). Participants in the human-like robot condition showed a 
significantly higher rating score than participants in the machine-like robot condition 
(Mhuman-like=2.32, Mmachine-like=1.25, p  < .01) providing evidence that the belief 
manipulation was efficient. 
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Discussion 
Using a Social Simon Task that was shared between a human and a humanoid robot, 
we tested whether action co-representation as measured by the SSE does occur in a 
real world interaction situation with a robotic agent. Further, we tested if the amount 
of action co-representation can be modulated by the believed humanness of the 
robot’s functional principle. We found a reliable and robust SSE, when the robot was 
described as functioning in a biologically inspired human-like way. When the robot 
was described as a purely deterministic machine-like agent the SSE was completely 
abolished. Critically, the SSE in the human-like robot condition was significantly 
larger than the SSE in the machine-like robot condition as indicated by a significant 
interaction of compatibility and belief. Even if the size of the SSE was relatively 
modest when interacting with a humanoid robot, it is comparable to that of other 
studies on the SSE measuring human-human interaction (e.g., Guagnano et al., 2010, 
Experiment 1: 7 ms; Liepelt et al., 2011: 9 ms; Sebanz et al., 2003, Experiment 1: 11 
ms, Experiment 2: 8 ms). 
These findings suggest that the human shared representational system is not 
solely tuned to biological agents. Action co-representation can occur in a real world 
interaction situation with a non-biological robotic agent. Further, our results suggest 
an essential role of top-down belief processes on action co-representation, and 
provide evidence for differences in action co-representation within the class of 
artificial agents depending on their assumed functional principle. In order to co-
represent the actions of an artificial agent, it seems to be crucial to perceive the agent 
as functioning in a human-like or biologically inspired way.  
A recent development in robotics is to produce artificial agents that look more 
and more human-like in order to facilitate interactions with humans (Kanda, 
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Miyashita, Osada, Haikawa, & Ishiguro, 2008; MacDorman & Ishiguro, 2006). The 
humanoid robot we used in our study had a rather non-human physical appearance. 
Nevertheless, we found evidence for action co-representation when participants 
attributed human-like cognitive processes to the robot. This suggests a critical role of 
top-down belief processes (Liepelt & Brass, 2010; Stanley et al., 2007), which may 
have been underestimated in previous research on biological tuning of the shared 
representational system, as well as in social robotics. When constructing a technical 
system that is able to interact with humans, one should not only consider a 
biologically inspired implementation of the form (head and body shape), or the 
motion (movement kinematics). One should also be aware of the observer’s beliefs 
about a robot’s functional principle, which may or may not match its actual functional 
principle. This is not to say that human-like physical appearance should not matter for 
action co-representation. One important direction for future research on human-robot 
interaction is how belief, form and movement kinematics may interact in affecting the 
amount of action co-representation.  
Taken together, our results suggest that action co-representation is not 
exclusively tuned to biological agents. Action co-representation can also occur for 
real robotic agents, when one believes that the robot functions in a biologically 
inspired, human-like way, suggesting a vital role of top-down belief processes in 
human-robot interactions.  
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Experimental setup: Social Simon Task shared between a human and a 
humanoid robot.  
 
Figure 2. Mean response times for compatible (light grey) and incompatible (dark 
grey) trials for the human-like robot condition (left) and the machine-like robot 
condition (right). Error bars represent standard errors of the mean differences. **: p <  
.01, n.s.: p > .05.
 Figure 1 
 
 Figure 2 
 
 
 
  
** 
n.s. 
